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Recent progress in fetal-cell surgery foreshadows a growing demand
for fetuses as a source of transplant tissue. Tissue taken from aborted
fetuses is being transplanted into humans to treat diabetes and immu-
nodeficiency diseases.2 Researchers also hope that fetal tissue will pro-
vide a cure for Parkinson's, 3 Alzheimer's, 4 and Huntington's diseases5 as
well as spinal cord injuries6 and hemophilia.
7
Because a primary source of tissue for these transplants has been
electively aborted fetuses,8 there is growing concern over the means by
which researchers obtain such fetuses as well as concern for protecting
the welfare of the fetus. In response, the Reagan Administration recently
placed a temporary ban on all human experiments using electively
aborted fetal tissue at the National Institute of Health (NIH) until an
advisory committee can study the ethical, medical, and legal implications
of this procedure. 9 This ban, however, does not extend to transplants
conducted in the private sector, those not funded by the NIH. Conse-
quently, in many instances, regulation of tissue transplants is left to state
fetal research laws as well as state tissue and organ donation statutes.
While restrictions of state fetal research laws vary,' 0 some regulate
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"Fetal research" is often defined to include virtually any nontherapeutic use of fetal tis-
[10791
the conditions of fetal research to the extent that fetal tissue transplants
may, arguably, be prohibited in those jurisdictions. I1 In states with less
restrictive or no fetal research legislation, the procurement of fetal tissue
is governed by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), a set of laws
adopted by all states which governs the donation of tissue and organs.12
Unfortunately, neither the UAGA nor the research laws address certain
unique issues of this new medical procedure.
Of the many dilemmas this new procedure presents, this Note spe-
cifically addresses the propriety of women deliberately becoming preg-
nant to supply relatives, friends, or themselves with fetal tissue. Several
cases have been reported of women desiring to do this, 13 though there are
no reported instances of it actually occurring. The likelihood of this sce-
nario, however, cannot be ignored considering the following: the current
shortage of fetal tissue for recent experimental transplants,' 4 and the po-
tentially staggering demand for tissue should the procedure prove as suc-
cessful as presently indicated; the greater need for compatibility between
the fetal tissue and recipient for certain types of treatment;15 the present
high cost and limited types and quantities of cloned fetal tissue; 16 the
danger of "flawed" tissue received from an anonymous donor; and the
possibility of storing fetal tissue, like blood, for future family use.17
As originally promulgated, I"the express language of the UAGA au-
thorizes either parent of an aborted fetus19 to donate the remains to a
sue. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984) (prohibiting "use [ofi any
aborted product of human conception... for any type of scientific or laboratory research or
for any other kinds of experimentation or study, except to protect or preserve the life and
health of the fetus.")
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (1986): A person shall not know-
ingly use any human fetus or embryo, living or dead, or any parts, organs or fluids of any such
fetus or embryo resulting from an induced abortion in any manner for any medical experimen-
tation or scientific or medical investigation purposes except as is strictly necessary to diagnose
a disease or condition in the mother of the fetus or embryo and only if the abortion was
performed because of such disease or condition.
12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988) (Table
of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
13. See, e.g., Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49
(woman desired to become pregnant to supply tissue to father with Parkinson's disease); Ex-
press: Fetal Cell Transplants, (KQED television broadcast, Mar. 1, 1988) (audio tape on file at
The Hastings Law Journal) (woman suffering from diabetes expressed an interest in becoming
pregnant to supply herself with fetal pancreatic tissue); Thorne, Trade in Human Tissue Needs
Regulation, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1987, at 16, col. 3 (woman attempting to aid ailing father
sought to be artificially inseminated with his sperm so as to later abort fetus in third trimester
and supply her father with the fetal kidney tissue).
14. Maugh, supra note 9, at 1.
15. See infra note 40.
16. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 47-48 and accompanying text.
18. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b)(3), 8A U.L.A. 34 (West 1983).
19. Id. § l(b), 8A U.L.A. 30.
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specific individual20and permits this tissue to be used for transplanta-
tion.21 Thus, in states regulating fetal tissue use solely through the
UAGA, deliberate production of fetal tissue by a woman for transplant
purposes appears permissible.
While the potential clinical benefits of fetal tissue transplantation
are undisputed, the manner of obtaining such tissue deserves careful re-
view. An appropriate legislative or judicial response to issues surround-
ing fetal tissue use must balance the interests of those needing this life-
saving tissue against the interest of society in preventing the degradation
of women and the reproductive process. To achieve this balance, this
Note proposes that states amend their enactment of the UAGA to pro-
hibit either parent from designating the recipient of fetal tissue resulting
from an elective abortion.22 By denying a parent the ability to designate a
recipient, this amendment will discourage women from becoming preg-
nant to supply fetal tissue. Moreover, in the case of an accidental preg-
nancy, the amendment would prevent an ailing friend or relative from
pressuring the mother into aborting for donative purposes. At the same
time, parents should not be prevented from consenting to an anonymous
tissue donation. Thus, while an individual recipient could not receive
tissue donated by a relative or friend, he or she could receive it from an
anonymous donor through a tissue bank.
A primary concern in prohibiting recipient designation2 3 is that the
proposal may interfere with a woman's constitutionally protected right to
privacy in reproductive decisions. This Note, however, argues that the
ability to designate the recipient of one's fetal tissue does not fall within
the right to privacy. To a substantial degree, courts have limited protec-
tion of reproductive choices to a woman's decision whether to bear a
living child,24 and, in some instances, to the intimacies of the physical
relationship. 25 The proposal does not infringe on this decision or any
other privacy right.
Since the proposal does not interfere with the exercise of a funda-
mental right, it is subject to review under the rational basis test.26 To
withstand this constitutional scrutiny, the state must show that the legis-
20. Id § 4(c), 8A U.L.A. 41.
21. Id § 3(4), 8A U.L.A. 41.
22. Several commentators have mentioned this proposal without elaboration. See, eg.,
Dempsey, Use of Fetal Remains in Medical Treatment Provokes a Furor Over Ownership of
Tissue, The Recorder, Sept. 8, 1987, at 19, col. 1. (citing Patricia King, Associate Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center); Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts, Nat'l L.J.,
Dec. 7, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
23. "Recipient designation," as used herein, refers to the parent's ability to choose (desig-
nate) what person (recipient) will receive the fetal tissue resulting from an elective abortion.
24. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
26. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW, § 14.29(b), at 696
(3d. ed. 1986).
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lation furthers a legitimate state interest.27 The proposal satisfies this test
because the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the exploitation
of women and fetuses. This interest is protected by regulating the dona-
tion procedure.
In section I, the Note provides an overview of the medical and statu-
tory background of fetal tissue use. Current regulatory inadequacies are
discussed in Section II and a proposal is made to prohibit either parent
from designating the recipient of fetal tissue from an elective abortion.
Section III analyzes the right to privacy and its role in challenges to fetal
experimentation statutes. This section argues that the proposal would
not violate a woman's right to privacy because her fundamental repro-
ductive right extends primarily to decisions regarding childbearing,
which do not include designation of a fetal tissue recipient. Section III
also argues that the proposal is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest and is not unnecessarily overbroad. Finally, the Note concludes
that this proposal would withstand a constitutional challenge and is nec-
essary to protect against the degradation of women and the reproductive
process.
I. Fetal Tissue Uses and Regulation
A. Uses
The results of experimental treatment for Parkinson's disease well
illustrate the potential benefits that can be realized with fetal tissue trans-
plantation. Parkinson's is caused by a deterioration of brain cells that
produce dopamine, 28 a neurochemical responsible for proper motor coor-
dination.29 A dopamine deficiency results in tremors and rigidity. 30 By
removing dopamine producing brain cells from the appropriate part of a
fetal brain and transplanting them into an adult brain, scientists have
succeeded in nearly eradicating symptoms of Parkinson's in monkeys.3'
This same procedure has been used several times on human subjects with
apparent success. 32 The first reported human recipients of fetal brain tis-
sue showed marked improvement within eight weeks of the transplant. 33
Recent experiments suggest a vast array of medical uses for fetal
27. "Normally the legislature may regulate activities so long as the legislation has some
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." Id.
28. Jaroff, Steps Toward a Brave New World, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 56.
29. McAuliffe, supra note 1, at 69.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Transplantation of Fetal Substantia Nigra and Adrenal Medulla to the Caudate Nu-
cleus in Two Patients with Parkinson's Disease, New Eng. J. Med., Jan. 7, 1988, at 51, col. I
[hereinafter Parkinson's Transplantation].
33. See id. This may be explained by the tendency of fetal brain tissue "to find its way to
the brain site appropriate to its physiological function." Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 9.
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tissue. In addition to treating Parkinson's disease, 34 fetal brain tissue
may be used to treat Alzheimer's, and Huntington's diseases. 35 To the
one million Americans afflicted with Parkinson's, two and a half to three
million afflicted with Alzheimer's, and 25,000 suffering from Hunting-
ton's disease, these experiments represent significant hope.36 "Fetal re-
search has also shown promising preliminary results in treatment of
diabetes and certain blood disorders such as anemia, radiation sickness,
and leukemia. AIDS researchers are beginning to experiment with fetal
tissue to determine whether it can help protect the immune system."
37
The procedure for performing a fetal tissue transplant resembles the
typical organ transplant operation. Human organ transplants involve the
transfer of an organ from the body of a donor to the body of a recipient
at the same or different site as that from which the organ originated.
38
Tissue transplantation involves the same procedure except that a portion
of an organ or other tissue mass is transferred, rather than the entire
organ. For purposes of this Note, fetal tissue transplantation refers to
the removal of tissue from a fetus ex utero (out of womb) and the implan-
tation of that tissue into another human.
39
For transplantation, fetal tissue may be preferable to adult tissue for
the following reasons. Transplanted fetal tissue is less likely to result in
compatibility problems because fetal cells are immunologically naive:
they have yet to develop the distinctive antigens which often cause a re-
34. Parkinson's Transplantation, supra note 32, at 51, col. 1.
35. McAuliffe, supra note 1, at 69-70.
36. Thorne, supra note 13, at 16, col. 3. Use of fetal brain tissue poses unique ethical
problems for some because it suggests a greater violation of the fetus than the removal of other
types of tissue. As one physician commented, implanting fetal brain tissue stirs a public mis-
conception" 'based on Frankenstein, that we are transplanting personalities.'" Do Brain Cells
Suffer? Tough Questions in the Lab, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1986, at 69 (quoting
Dr. Ake Seiger) [hereinafter Tough Questions]. Yet, just as there are no restrictions on what
organs or tissue may be removed from a cadaver and transplanted into a living human being,
there would appear to be no reason to place restrictions on the types of fetal tissue that can be
used for transplants if the fetus is dead. As with cadaver donors, it is more appropriate to
regulate the conditions and circumstances under which the fetal tissue is procured and
distributed.
37. Specter, NIH told to Stop Use of Aborted Fetuses, Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1988, at
Al.
38. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETHics 1160 (W. Reich ed. 1978).
39. Generally, fetuses aborted within the first two trimesters of a pregnancy (the first six
months) are too immature to provide viable organs but may supply useful tissue. Telephone
interview with Dr. Frank Sharp, Professor of Neurology, University of California at San Fran-
cisco, V.A. Medical Center (Mar. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Sharp]. Consequently, it is important
to distinguish between tissue or cell transplantation using fetuses from early to mid-gestation,
which this Note discusses, and organ transplantation using infants born within the last trimes-
ter of a pregnancy. For a discussion on harvesting organs from anencephalic infants see Harri-
son, The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at
12.
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cipient's body to reject transplanted tissue. 4° The tissue's lack of maturity
also reduces the incidence of graft-versus-host reaction, which occurs
when the transplant tissue attacks the host tissue in the recipient's
body.41 Additionally, because of its immaturity, fetal tissue has a greater
capacity than adult tissue to regenerate and grow once transplanted.
42
Biologically, the tissue used for a fetal tissue transplant can come
from either a spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) or an elective abor-
tion.43 In practice, however, tissue from electively aborted, healthy fe-
tuses is usually preferable because a spontaneous abortion often involves
a defective fetus.44 Also, the location and conditions under which a spon-
taneous abortion typically occurs--outside of medical facilities-make
miscarried fetuses an unreliable source given the proper planning needed
to retrieve the tissue while it is still useful.
45
Several factors are important to effective transplantation. With cur-
rent technology, the timing of transplantation is crucial to successful
treatment. Fetal tissue ceases to function and develop within several
hours after death and normally requires immediate transplantation.
46
Some scientists, however, have successfully transplanted fetal neural tis-
sue which had been frozen and revived in rats and monkeys.47 This sug-
gests the possibility of fetal tissue banks which surgeons could draw upon
for future operations and which families could use to store their own
tissue supply.
48
The maturity of the fetus when aborted may also affect the quality of
the tissue. In the case of Parkinson's, the optimal tissue for treatment
reportedly comes from a fetus no later than nine weeks.49 To treat diabe-
40. Levine, Help from the Unborn: Fetal-Cell Surgery Raises Hopes--and Issues, TIME,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 62; see Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 10.
The compatibility of tissue is both a function of tissue typing-which is a similarity be-
tween the donor's and the recipient's antigens-and blood typing. A perfect match, however,
is difficult to find. Through the use of the drug cyclosporine, physicians have been able to
alleviate many of the problems of tissue rejection which occur when there is incompatibility in
tissue or blood type. Sharp, supra note 39.
Generally, brain tissue is protected from the immune system, and thus rejection of fetal
brain tissue will not be a problem. Id. Other types of fetal tissue, such as pancreatic tissue,
however, do require greater compatibility between donor and recipient. Id. Hence, while fetal
pancreatic tissue may be less prone to rejection because of its immaturity, compatibility will
still be a concern which physicians will most likely treat with cyclosporine.
41. Levine, supra note 40, at 62.
42. Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 10.
43. Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 13.
44. Id.
45. Sherman, supra note 22, at 1, col. 1.
46. Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 10.
47. Jaroff, supra note 28, at 56.
48. Id.
49. Express: Fetal Cell Transplants, supra note 13 (KQED television broadcast, Mar. 2,
1988) (audio tape on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
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tes, the fourteenth week of gestation may be the best time to obtain fetal
islet cells from the pancreas.50 The type of abortion procedure employed
may also impact on the desirability of the tissue.5i
Many questions about this procedure, however, remain unanswered.
For instance, scientists have yet to study the long term effectiveness of
fetal tissue in the treatment of Parkinson's, diabetes, or other disorders.
Also unknown at this time is the quantity of tissue required to treat a
disease.5 2 One researcher has indicated that up to twenty-five fetal pan-
creases are needed to treat successfully one adult diabetic. 3 Alterna-
tively, much less tissue is apparently needed to treat a Parkinson's
patient.
54
The use of freshly aborted fetuses for these transplants is currently
being supplemented by tissue cloned from previously aborted fetuses.
One biotechnology firm has developed techniques to propagate pancreas
cells extracted from aborted fetuses, potentially allowing them to mass
produce fetal tissue.55 "[T]he company is now able to grow enough cells
from one fetal pancreas to treat 20 adult diabetics." 56A similar technique
is being developed for the production of brain cells to treat Parkinson's. 5 7
There are certain limits, however, to the use of cloned fetal tissue.
When compatibility is a concern, a potential recipient would have to
have tissue cloned from a compatible fetus. Also, there is limited availa-
bility of the only tissue presently cloned, pancreatic tissue. The company
developing this tissue hopes to be able to provide pancreatic cells for
15,000 patients per year by 1991;58 there are, however, approximately
600,000 insulin-dependant diabetics in the United States. 59 The cost of
cloned fetal cells, about $5,000 for diabetes treatment,6" may still provide
50. Maugh, supra note 9, at 28, col. 2. The appropriate stage of fetal development for
treating all diseases, however, remains unclear. "Taking the tissue too early, for example,
might result in runaway growth that could wreak havoc .... " Jaroff, supra note 28, at 57.
51. Hysterotomy, while presenting the greatest danger to a pregnant woman, is the least
damaging to the fetus, thus providing superior tissue. Conversely, dilation and evacuation is
the least dangerous for a pregnant woman but the most damaging to the fetus. Ethical Op-
tions, supra note 3, at 13. Potential for manipulation of the method and timing of the abortion
suggests that some form of "Chinese wall" should be erected between the woman having an
abortion and the transplant surgeon. Cf 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(3) (1987) ("Individuals en-
gaged in [fetal research] will have no part in: (i) Any decision as to the timing, method, and
procedures used to terminate the pregnancy ....
52. Jaroff, supra note 28, at 57.
53. Maugh, supra note 9, at 28, col. 1.
54. See, eg., Parkinson's Transplantation, supra note 32 (tissue from a single fetus used to
treat two Parkinson's patients).
55. Petit, supra note 7, at A4, col. 5.
56. Maugh, supra note 9, at 28, col. 4.
57. Id. at 29, col. 2.
58. Id. at 29, col. 1.
59. Petit, supra note 7, at A4, col. 6.
60. Id.
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a woman with the incentive to provide her own tissue. Finally, there
remains the danger of unknown viruses or diseases present in anony-
mously donated tissue.
B. Current Regulation of Fetal Tissue Use
Fetal tissue use is regulated by laws concerning fetal research as well
as laws governing organ and tissue donations. At the federal level, regu-
lations cover only research funded through the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS).61 Currently, the DHHS has placed a tem-
porary ban on all fetal tissue transplants conducted at the NIH. 62 At the
state level, the UAGA regulates tissue and organ donations in all fifty
states, and approximately one half of the states have specific statutes gov-
erning fetal research.
63
(1) Federal Regulation of Fetal Tissue Use
Recently, the DHHS, in response to a researcher's proposal to im-
plant fetal brain tissue into a Parkinson's patient, banned all human ex-
periments at the NIH that use tissue from an aborted fetus. 64 The ban
will remain effective until an advisory committee has had an opportunity
to consider the ethical, medical, and legal implications of fetal tissue
transplants. 65 Significantly, this federal ban applies to research only at
the NIH and does not prevent privately funded fetal tissue transplants.
Because the NIH is perceived as the nation's research leader, however,
many hospital institution review boards overseeing academic research
may take into account the NIH ban.66 Moreover, the impact of this ban
cannot be underestimated given the significant funding the NIH provides
for fetal research.
67
Not surprisingly, shortly following Roe v. Wade,6San analogous
moratorium was imposed on federally funded fetal research. 69 Likewise,
a commission was appointed which drafted the current regulations gov-
erning fetal research funded through the DHHS.70 Until the recent ban,
these research regulations presumably would have governed fetal tissue
61. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (1987) (providing that federal regulations pertaining to
research, development, and related activities involving, inter alia, fetuses and pregnant women
"are applicable to all [DHHS] grants and contracts").
62. Specter, supra note 37, at Al.
63. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
64. Specter, supra note 37, at Al.
65. Id.
66. Maugh, supra note 9, at 1, col. 1.
67. "In 1987, about 118 U.S. research groups received $11.8 million-about 2% of
NIH's total budget-for research involving fetal cells .... " Id. at 28, col. 1.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)




transplants at the NIH. Undoubtedly, the inadequacies of these guide-
lines as applied to fetal tissue transplants influenced the decision to effect
a temporary ban. Nonetheless, it is instructive to review the research
regulations to highlight various distinctions certain to play a role in any
federal transplant regulations.
As with the ban on fetal tissue transplants, federal regulation of fetal
research applies only to research funded through the DHHS.71 These
regulations expressly state they do not preempt state laws.72 "Research"
is defined by the regulations as a "systematic investigation designed to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge."' 73 Even if a particular
procedure does not meet the definition of "research" or the work is not
federally funded, these regulations are often an important source of
guidelines for medical institutions conducting fetal experiments.
The federal research regulations, as well as many state fetal research
laws, recognize certain common distinctions. The first is between live
and dead fetuses. Federal law defers all regulation of research on dead
fetuses ex utero to state and local laws.74
With respect to live fetuses ex utero, the federal regulations provide
an intricate scheme built upon distinctions between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research, and viable and nonviable fetuses. Therapeutic re-
search is that which is intended to benefit the subject.75 Measurement of
fetal heart activity in utero is an example of such research.76 Experimen-
tal surgery on the fetus ex utero intended to save the fetus' life would also
be classified as therapeutic research. Alternatively, nontherapeutic re-
search is that which cannot possibly benefit the research subject,
although it may benefit others.77 Because fetal tissue transplants involve
two subjects-a donor (fetus) and a recipient-the procedure is best de-
scribed as nontherapeutic for the fetus and therapeutic for the recipient.
A second distinction made by the regulatory scheme is between via-
ble and nonviable fetuses. Viability and nonviability are defined by the
regulations as follows:
(d) "Viable"... [refers to a fetus which is] able, after either spontane-
ous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of available medi-
cal therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration.... If a fetus is viable after delivery, it is a premature
infant.
(e) "Nonviable" ... [refers to] a fetus ex utero which, although living,
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1987).
72. Id § 46.201(b).
73. I d § 46.102(e).
74. Id § 46.210.
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is not viable.78
Employing the above distinctions, the federal regulations prohibit a
viable fetus ex utero from being the subject of research. 79 In addition, if a
fetus' viability is uncertain, it may not be the subject of research unless
there is no added risk to its life from the research or the research en-
hances the fetus' possibility for survivalas If fetal transplants are regu-
lated in a similar fashion, transplants would be prohibited from the viable
infant, as well as the questionably viable fetus, unless the procedure
posed no added risk to the fetus.
Perhaps the most pertinent federal restriction is the ban on research
of any kind on a live nonviable fetus ex utero that would prematurely
terminate the fetus' life.8 This ban may be significant because the proce-
dure required for removing fetal brain tissue transplantation would
hasten the death of a live fetus.82 Thus, if a similar restriction were im-
posed on fetal tissue transplants, it would prohibit the removal of fetal
brain tissue and, potentially, other types of tissue, from live nonviable
fetuses.8
3
Significantly, the federal research regulations do not distinguish be-
tween fetal materials resulting from elective and spontaneous abortions.
The directive from the DHHS to the NIH imposing the current ban did
not oppose the use from miscarriages or stillbirths, but specifically asked
the advisory committee to consider whether the use of fetal tissue in re-
search encourages women to have abortions. 84
(2) The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) is the most widely used
system of statutes governing tissue and organ donation. The UAGA was
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to encourage anatomical gifts within and among states. It has been
78. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d)-(e) (1987).
79. Id. § 46.209(c).
80. Id. § 46.209(a).
81. The federal regulations provide:
(b) No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an activity covered by this
subpart unless: (1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained, (2)
Experimental activities which of themselves would terminate the heartbeat or respira-
tion of the fetus will not be employed, and (3) The purpose of the activity is the
development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other
means.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Ethical Options, supra note 3, at 11.
83. Some researchers have suggested that the use of tissue from even live nonviable fe-
tuses can be justified given the demand for such tissue, particularly where the fetus is not
subject to any pain. Id. at 12.
84. Specter, supra note 37, at Al.
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adopted, with minor modifications, by all fifty states. 85 The UAGA pro-
vides a number of guidelines that an individual can follow to effectuate
an organ donation.
The UAGA deals only with postmortem gifts86 of all or part of a
body, including tissue.87 The definition of decedent under the UAGA
includes a stillborn fetus. 88 Notably, as with the federal research regula-
tions, the UAGA does not distinguish between a stillborn fetus resulting
from a spontaneous abortion and one resulting from an elective abortion.
Hence, it may be presumed to apply to tissue donations in either
situation.
Under section 2(b), the donor of a fetus may be, in descending order
of priority, "either parent, . . . an adult brother or sister, . . . a guardian
of the decedent at the time of his death, . . . [or] any other person au-
thorized or under obligation to dispose of the body."8 9 There are two
important qualifications to this hierarchy of donors. First, if a person in
a prior class is available at the time of death, then a person lower in line
cannot effectuate the donation. 90 Thus, for all effective purposes, only the
parents of an aborted fetus could donate the fetal tissue since they are
highest in priority and the mother would almost always be available at
the time of the fetus' death. Second, if one parent opposes the donation,
he or she may block the other from donating the fetal tissue.91
The purpose of an anatomical gift under the UAGA may be for
research, therapy, or transplantation. 92 Most importantly, a gift may be
made to a specified donee, 93 which may be an individual, hospital, uni-
versity, or storage bank.
94
In sum, the terms of the UAGA appear to permit the use of fetal
tissue for transplants. Furthermore, either parent can designate a recipi-
ent of fetal tissue resulting from an elective or spontaneous abortion.
Consequently, nothing contained within the terms of the UAGA prohib-
85. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr, 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (Table
of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
86. Id § 2(a), 8A U.L.A 34.
87. Id § l(e), 8A U.L.A. 30.
88. Id § 1(b), 8A U.L.A. 30.
89. Id § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34.
90. Id.
91. Id § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 34. Section 2(c) of the UAGA prohibits a donee from ac-
cepting a gift if the donee knows that the gift is opposed by one parent. For example, if the
mother wants to donate fetal tissue to a relative but the husband opposes it, the relative may
not accept the donation if the relative has knowledge of the father's opposition. For a related
discussion of whether a parent should be allowed to consent to organ donation from incompe-
tent minors or adults who are alive, see R. ScoTr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 101-39 (1981),
and Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1182, 1193-201 (1974).
92. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41 (1983).
93. Id. § 4(c), 8A U.L.A. 44.
94. Id § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41.
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its a woman from becoming pregnant for the sole purpose of supplying a
specific individual with tissue.
(3) State Fetal Research Regulations
Although the UAGA implicitly authorizes the use of fetal tissue for
"research" or "transplantation," approximately one half of the states
supplement and sometimes preempt this broad authorization with spe-
cific statutes governing fetal experimentation or research. 95 A majority of
regulating states prohibit nontherapeutic research on live fetuses ex
utero. 96 In these states, the removal of tissue from live fetuses for use in
transplantations would be prohibited, if the transplantation is considered
research.
97
In comparison, a majority of regulating states permit nontherapeutic
research on dead fetuses.98 Again, as applied to fetal tissue transplants,
the removal of tissue from dead fetuses for transplantation would be al-
lowed in such states. These laws are consistent with the UAGA, which
also permits the use of tissue from dead fetuses for transplants.
A small number of states prohibit any nontherapeutic research on
dead fetuses and thus, apparently prohibit fetal tissue transplants. 99 The
constitutionality of several of these statutes, however, has been chal-
lenged on the grounds that they interfere with a woman's protected right
to an abortion or are unconstitutionally vague. 1°°
Some states require parental consent before research may be per-
formed.101 Unlike the UAGA, however, no state statutes specifically ad-
dress the issue of recipient designation because research regulations were
not originally intended to cover tissue donations much less tissue
transplants.
95. Terry, "'Alasl Poor Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and
Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REv. 419,
446 n. 195 (1986); see also Baron, supra note 10, at 14-15 (twenty-five states have no restrictions
on fetal research other than under the UAGA; restrictions in the remaining states range from
requiring only maternal consent to prohibiting any nontherapeutic research on dead fetuses
from elective abortion).
96. See Baron, supra note 10, at 14-15.
97. "Research" is often defined to include virtually any nontherapeutic use of fetal tissue.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984) (prohibiting the "use [ofl any
aborted product of human conception... for any type of scientific or laboratory research or
for any other kind of experimentation or study, except to protect or preserve the life and health
of the fetus").
98. Baron, supra note 10, at 14-15.
99. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (1986).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 138-63.
101. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977) (providing that "experi-
mentation with fetuses without written consent of the woman shall be prohibited").
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II. The Proposal: Prohibiting Recipient Designation
The possibilities for therapeutic use of fetal tissue were unknown to
the drafters of the UAGA and the fetal research guidelines. Conse-
quently, in some instances, research laws may inhibit successful fetal tis-
sue transplants by affording too much protection to the fetus. 102 Yet, the
majority of state organ and tissue donation statutes inadequately regulate
fetal tissue use by failing to prohibit certain problematic donations.
For example, some women have expressed a desire to become preg-
nant in order to supply fetal tissue to specific individuals.10 3 Even if a
woman has not intentionally conceived for the purpose of supplying tis-
sue, the ability to designate a tissue recipient may increase a woman's
incentive to abort. Two possible incentives are to receive remuneration
for the fetal tissue, and to aid a friend, a relative, or herself.
Remuneration for supplying human organs for use in transplanta-
tion is prohibited under the National Organ Transplant Act. 1° 4 Specifi-
cally, the Act provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer
affects interstate commerce." 10 5 Preventing an exchange in fetal materi-
als could be accomplished by expanding the Act to ban the sale of any
fetal organs or tissue. 10 6 Recently, petitions have been filed with the
DHHS requesting this amendment.
10 7
Prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue, however, does not remedy the
equally problematic situation of women deliberately conceiving with the
intention of supplying themselves, a relative, or a friend with aborted
fetal tissue. Also troublesome is the specter of women who, having be-
come pregnant accidentally, feel pressured into having an abortion to aid
an ailing friend or relative. Both scenarios are possible under the current
UAGA provisions, which permit either parent of a dead fetus to donate
102. See supra note 11.
103. See sources cited supra note 13.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 273-274e (Supp. III 1985). Although the prohibition applies only to sales
affecting "interstate commerce," the court's broad reading of this term is likely to encompass
intrastate sales. See Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1025
(1985) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that "the courts... will probably continue their broad
construction of Congress' Commerce Clause power and will find that intrastate organ sales do
'affect interstate commerce'" (quoting generally, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942)). Id at 1025 n.98.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (Supp. III 1985).
106. Life, Death and Fetal Tissue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at 22, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
Contra Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 37 (argu-
ing that potential donors should have the autonomy to treat their own body parts as property
for the purpose of sales).
107. Lawton, Fetal Tissue Transplants Stir Controversy, CHRISTIANrrY TODAY, Mar. 18,
1988 at 52.
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all or part of the fetus to a specific individual.108 Only the NIH and the
small minority of states that prohibit or severely restrict any nonthera-
peutic research on a fetus foreclose this possibility. 10 9
Before considering how such conduct could be prevented, it is ap-
propriate to consider briefly the state's interests in preventing the deliber-
ate production of fetal tissue. 110 The position of this Note is that allowing
a woman to conceive for the purpose of subsequent transplantation is an
abuse of the reproductive process. The woman becomes, in essence, an
organ farm. Moreover, while a woman has a constitutionally protected
right to become pregnant or have an abortion regardless of her motiva-
tion, these rights do not eliminate the state's interest in protecting the
fetus. Although the fetus may not be a person within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, 11' the pregnant woman does not have the un-
questioned right to exploit the fetus for her own or others' benefit. As
one author stated in the context of fetal research, "[e]ven if [the fetus']
personhood is denied, the dignity it is accorded, while not sufficient by
itself to countermand the needs of medical research, should be sufficient
to compel elaborate safeguards to eliminate offensive and degrading
forms of research."' 1 2 Similar safeguards are appropriate to prevent the
deliberate production of fetal tissue. In addition, the state has a strong
interest in protecting a woman from being pressured by others into do-
nating or intentionally producing fetal tissue.'
1 3
An acceptable regulatory response would be to construct a "Chinese
wall" between the donor and the recipient. Because tissue donation may
only be effectuated in accordance with the state's enactment of the
UAGA, this Note proposes that states amend their versions of the
UAGA to prohibit either parent from being able to donate fetal tissue
resulting from an elective abortion to a specific individual. Such an
amendment would remove an important incentive for a woman conceiv-
ing for the purpose of supplying tissue, or, if accidentally pregnant,
choosing to abort for this purpose, because neither parent could insure
that a desired individual would receive the tissue.1 14 The proposal repre-
108. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34 (West 1983).
109. See supra note 11.
110. For a more in-depth discussion of these interests, see infra notes 192-97 and accompa-
nying text.
111. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
112. Cf Wilson, Fetal Experimentation: Legal Implications of an Ethical Conundrum, 53
DEN. L.J. 581, 618 (1976) One commentator has described the pro-life movement's position on
allowing recipient designation as "'going to a murderer and asking him if he would like to
donate the victim's' [remains]." Dempsey, supra note 22, at 18, col. 2 (quoting Patricia King,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
113. See infra note 195-96 and accompanying text.
114. Assuming fetal tissue transplants are allowed under the law, a woman might still feel
compelled to supply fetal tissue to help anonymous donors. Thus, the proposal does not pur-
port to remove all possible incentives to conceive and abort.
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sents a practical solution given the difficulty of enforcing a regulation
with a mens rea element; one which would prohibit women from inten-
tionally becoming pregnant for the purpose of supplying fetal tissue.
115
In prohibiting recipient designation, however, neither parent should
be prevented from donating the aborted tissue for transplantation pur-
poses to an unspecified individual. For instance, a parent should still be
able to donate the tissue to a hospital, tissue bank, or medical school for
use in tissue transplants to anonymous donees. 116 Even some opponents
of legalized abortion recognize that as long as this valuable tissue is avail-
able, it should be used for a productive purpose.
117
In contrast to many state fetal research statutes and the federal re-
search regulations, the proposed ban on recipient designation should not
depend on the status of the fetus following the abortion procedure (i.e.,
viable, nonviable, or dead). While the determination of the fetus' status
is important in minimizing or eliminating the risk of fetal suffering in
experiments and transplants, the status of the fetus is inconsequential to
the proposal's twin goals of preventing a woman ab initio from becoming
pregnant in order to supply fetal tissue and removing an increased incen-
tive to abort. If the prohibition on recipient designation is to be effective,
it must apply whether the fetus is live or stillborn, viable or nonviable.
Because of its unanimous acceptance within the fifty states, the
UAGA is the most logical piece of legislation for states to amend in en-
acting this proposal. Naturally, the success of the proposal depends on
the cooperation of all states in enacting similar legislation. Otherwise, if
only certain states prohibit recipient designation, a woman could travel
to a state without such a prohibition in order to designate the recipient.
One commentator has gone so far as to advocate international regula-
tions, since a donor could effectuate a desired tissue transfer by simply
going to a country with no similar restrictions."
8
On a practical level, the effectiveness of the proposed amendment
might be questioned in certain situations. For instance, the proposal may
prove ineffective when the pregnant woman shares a rare tissue and
blood type with an intended recipient and a match is important for the
type of tissue to be transplanted." 9 Even if the statute prohibits the wo-
man from specifying the donee, she is still free to donate the fetus to a
tissue bank. The tissue bank, in turn, could donate the tissue to the in-
tended recipient if that person is the first in order of priority to receive
115. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
116. Donating the tissue to organizations such as a tissue bank, however, still leaves issues
beyond the scope of this Note, such as who should receive the tissue and by what procedure
this should be determined.
117. Tough Questions, supra note 36, at 68.
118. Thorne, supra note 13, at 19, col. 3.
119. See supra note 39.
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the tissue. 120 In such cases, as long as neither parent retains control over
the tissue, the tissue bank should have the discretion to donate the tissue
as it determines necessary and appropriate, even if it goes to the parents'
desired recipient. To the extent that this may occur, the proposal repre-
sents a middle ground between no regulation of fetal tissue donations and
an overly broad regulation prohibiting any tissue donations amongst
friends and relatives.
III. The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Fetal Tissue Use
Regulating a parent's control over the disposition of fetal tissue ar-
guably may impact on reproductive decisions. For example, a woman's
inability to specify the recipient of tissue may dissuade her from conceiv-
ing in order to supply fetal tissue. If this is true, the proposal could be
attacked on grounds that it violates the right to privacy. The question
then becomes, how closely connected is the asserted liberty of recipient
designation to the reproductive rights protected under the right to pri-
vacy? In addressing this question, this section begins with a brief over-
view of the right to privacy and its application in the area of reproductive
autonomy.
A. The Right to Privacy Standard
The right to privacy is not expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
Its roots, however, have been found "in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the concept of liberty guaranteed
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment." 12' Given this diverse
genealogy, it is not surprising that the issues of what falls within the
ambit of the right to privacy, and whether such a right even exists, are
sharply debated.
The United States Supreme Court has described the right to privacy
as "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions."' 122 Accordingly, the Court has held that the right of parents
120. Tissue and organ banks determine the order of priority "in terms of need, probability
of success, and time on the waiting list. Probability of success will hinge in part on a match."
Donahue (Multimedia Entertainment, Inc.. television broadcast, Sept. 24, 1987) (quoting Dr.
James F. Childress, Ph.D., Professor of Religious Studies and Medical Education, University
of Virginia) (transcript on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citations omitted). The right to privacy was
first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
122. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). To determine whether a right (or a
decision) falls within the zone of privacy, one approach of the present majority of the Court
has been to examine two questions: (1) whether the right is " 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty,' " or (2) whether the right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The dissent in Bowers stated the right to privacy more broadly as
the " 'right to be let alone.' " Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Mar-
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to make decisions concerning their children's education, 123 the decision
to use contraception, 124 and a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy
by abortion 12 5are the types of important decisions encompassed within
the right to privacy. The right to make these decisions is deemed "funda-
mental," and as such is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion.
126
Even when government action does not directly interfere with the
exercise of privacy rights, a regulation may still constitute undue interfer-
ence if it indirectly hinders, discourages, or penalizes the exercise of a
protected right. For example, in Margaret S. v. Edwards (Margaret I), 127
the plaintiffs challenged a legislative scheme requiring parents to choose
between burial and cremation of an aborted fetus. The court struck
down the statute, finding that it would have a "chilling affect [sic] on a
woman's right to obtain an abortion and represents an impermissible at-
tempt of the State to influence a woman's abortion decision."
1 28
The right to privacy and the protection it affords, however, are not
absolute. State intrusion is warranted when there is a "compelling" state
interest in interfering with the fundamental right. 129 The Court has never
enunciated a clear standard for determining what constitutes a compel-
ling interest, and has only made that determination on a case-by-case
basis. In Roe, the Court gaged the substantiality of the state's interest in
regulating abortion by correlating it to the stage of fetal development. 130
The state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, the Court
determined, increases as the pregnancy advances.131 At the point of fetal
viability, the state's interest in protecting fetal life crosses the line from
strong to compelling because it is at this point that the fetus can presum-
ably live outside its mother.
132
In summary, constitutional scrutiny of regulations challenged as vi-
olating the right to privacy requires a two-part analysis. First, the court
determines whether the law or regulation burdens a fundamental right.
Second, the court considers the state interest furthered by the regulation.
If the regulation infringes on a fundamental right, the state's interest
must be compelling for the regulation to be upheld. 133 Alternatively,
shall, and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1929) (Bran-
deis, J. dissenting)).
123. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
124. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
126. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
127. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
128. Id at 223.
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
130. Id. at 162-64 passim.
131. Id. at 162-63.
132. Id. at 163.
133. Id. at 155-56.
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even if the regulation neither implicates nor unduly burdens a fundamen-
tal fight, it is invalid unless the regulation is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest. 134
B. Right to Privacy Attacks on Fetal Research Statutes
The area of privacy most analogous to recipient designation, ad-
dressed by the courts, concerns reproductive autonomy. At the heart of
a woman's reproductive autonomy is "[t]he decision whether or not to
beget or bear a child." 135 Access to contraception, abortion, and fetal
research all have been protected as essential to a woman's exercise of her
right to privacy. 136 Abortion, contraception, and fetal research, however,
are not themselves fundamental rights but are protected when "essential
to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of
childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Gris-
wold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade."' 137
To understand how the right of decision is implicated in the disposi-
tion of fetal tissue, it is particularly helpful to examine prior constitu-
tional challenges to state fetal research statutes. In Margaret S. v. Treen
(Margaret I1), the plaintiffs challenged a Louisiana statute prohibiting
nontherapeutic research on any dead or live fetus.1 38 They argued that
the provision unduly burdened a woman's right to undergo an abortion.
Specifically, they contended that the statute would deter women from
having abortions because the performance of an abortion would render
illegal, pathological exams "necessary to preserve the life and health of
the mother" and to disclose the likelihood of fetal deformities in future
pregnancies.' 39 The plaintiffs also asserted that the provision unconstitu-
tionally infringed on a doctor's right to conduct medical research. 40 Fi-
nally, the phrase "born as a result of an abortion" was attacked as
134. See supra note 26; see also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,
1426 (1974):
Most aspects of an individual's life are not "fundamental," and in these his liberty is
subject to the police power of federal and state governments, with presumptions of
statutory validity, and a heavy, generally hopeless, burden on a resisting individual to
show that a regulation has no conceivable public purpose, or that there is no rational
relation between means and ends.
Id. (footnote omitted).
135. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (abortion); Margaret S. v. Treen (Margaret II), 597 F. Supp. 636, 671-76 (E.D. La.
1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986)
(fetal research).
137. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89 (emphasis added).
138. 597 F. Supp. at 671-76.





In holding that the statute unduly burdened a woman's reproductive
rights, the district court reasoned along two lines. First, the statute was
found to "violatef the fundamental rights of women.., to make repro-
ductive choices." 142 By depriving a woman of information concerning
the likelihood of fetal deformities in future pregnancies, a woman was
denied the opportunity to make an informed decision whether to bear a
child at a later date.143 Hence, the opinion can be interpreted as holding
that fetal research that may inform or benefit a woman's reproductive
choices will be afforded protection and cannot be unduly burdened ab-
sent a compelling state interest.
Second, the court concluded that enforcement of the statute would
burden a woman's decision to have an abortion.144 The statute would
have the effect of inhibiting examination of the fetus which might dis-
close diseases or infections in the woman. The court held that the "de-
nial of such health care for women having abortions is a significant
burden on their right to choose to terminate their pregnancies." 1 45
Because the statute interfered with the rights of physicians to con-
duct research, the court concluded that the statute did not even pass the
rational basis test. 146 The court recognized that although a physician's
professional right to conduct research is not fundamental, it is still pro-
tected from arbitrary infringement under the Constitution.1 47 Since the
court found that the state's interest in protecting fetal life did not extend
beyond the death of the fetus, the court found that the provision arbitrar-
ily burdened a physician's professional rights. 148 Even if the purpose of
the Louisiana law were to afford the fetus the same dignity as a dead
child, the statute would still be inconsistent with the Louisiana Anatomi-
cal Gift Act, which allows research on deceased children. 149 The court
also held that the term "born as a result of an abortion" is unconstitu-
tionally vague "because it is impossible for a pathologist or other physi-
cian to distinguish tissue which is the product of an induced abortion
from that which is the product of a spontaneous abortion."
1 50
141. Id




146. Id at 674-75.
147. Id at 674.
148. Id at 675.
149. rd On appeal, the appellate court struck down the Louisiana provision because it
found the term "experimentation" to be unconstitutionally vague. Margaret II, 794 F.2d 994,
999 (5th Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, the appellate court did not discredit the lower couft's rea-
soning, stating that it "neither approve[d] nor disapprove[d] any of the rationales put forth by
the district court." Id at 998.
150. Margaret II, 597 F. Supp. at 675-76.
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Alternatively, when fetal research does not benefit a woman's con-
stitutionally protected reproductive rights and implicates only the as-
serted rights of medical researchers, a court is likely to uphold a fetal
research regulation if a legitimate state interest is served by the regula-
tion.151 Wynn v. Scott represents an early challenge to one of the post-
Roe fetal research regulations, the Illinois Abortion Act of 1975.152 The
Act provided that no premature infant or fetus aborted alive could be
used for nontherapeutic experimentation. Several physicians contended
that this provision "infringe[d] on the rights of medical researchers to
engage in research free from unreasonable governmental interference."
153
Consistent with Margaret 11,154 the Wynn court concluded that medical
researchers have no fundamental rights under the Constitution to per-
form fetal experiments.
1 55
Because the regulation did not have the effect of discouraging abor-
tions, however, its validity was decided under the rational basis test. 156 In
concluding that the test was met, the court noted that the state has broad
latitude in regulating social and health interests, which includes fetal re-
search. 157 Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to show that the regulation
was not rationally related to this interest.
1 58
Margaret I, 159although not involving a privacy challenge, also dealt
with a fetal research regulation that underwent the scrutiny of the ra-
tional basis test. Here, an earlier version of the statute challenged in
Margaret 11160 provided that "[n]o person shall experiment upon or sell
a live child or unborn child unless such experimentation is therapeutic to
the child or unborn child." 161 The court held that the danger of abuse
inherent in the expansion of fetal research was a legitimate basis for a
state to regulate in this area. 162 The statute protected the state's interest
in fetal life by proscribing nontherapeutic experiments on fetuses in
utero. 163
151. Proof of a state's interest is relatively easy to establish, given a state's broad interest in
regulating matters of health. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
152. 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Il. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d
193 (7th Cir. 1979).
153. Id. at 1322.
154. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
155. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322.
156. Id. Unlike the statute in Margaret II, the Illinois Act did not prohibit research on
dead fetuses, thereby affording a woman access to information bearing on her future reproduc-
tive decisions. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
157. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322.
158. Id.
159. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
160. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
161. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1981)
162. Margaret , 488 F. Supp. at 221.
163. Id. at 220 n.163.
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C. No Right to Privacy Violation by Restricting Fetal Tissue Recipient
Designation
Just as there is no fundamental right of access to fetal research, con-
traception, or abortion, there is no fundamental right to designate the
recipient of fetal tissue. At issue is whether the ability to designate the
recipient of fetal tissue "is essential to exercise of the constitutionally
protected right of decision in matters of childbearing"'164 or is essential to
decisions in any other privacy matters.
(1) Reproductive Choice
Arguably, a restriction on recipient designation will interfere with
reproductive decisions on the basis of motivation. Although courts have
never proscribed reproductive decisions (contraception, conception, or
abortion) based on a person's particular reasons for exercising their
rights, as stated in Carey v. Population Services International, 165 the crux
of the reproductive right is "[tihe decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child.' 166 Hence, when a woman is protected in her right to be-
come pregnant, it is for the purpose of bearing a living child. Alterna-
tively, a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy has been protected in
the early stages of pregnancy because a child may be unwanted or be-
cause the physical burdens of pregnancy and the potential psychological
and economic detriment to the woman and the child are too great.
167
These factors also relate to the decision of whether to have a living child.
Thus, the protection of reproductive rights has centered primarily on a
woman's decision whether to have a family.
168
Employing the reproductive system to produce a tissue mass does
not involve a decision of whether to have a living child and therefore is
not among the currently recognized reproductive rights. Rather, recipi-
ent designation involves a woman's interest in controlling the disposition
of fetal tissue to help another individual or herself. This interest is read-
ily distinguishable from the decision of whether to have a family. Addi-
tionally, restrictions on recipient designation do not directly infringe on a
childbearing decision since a woman is still free to abort or carry to term.
While the proposal does not directly interfere with a childbearing
decision, it would limit a woman's right to dispose of fetal tissue. Re-
164. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
167. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing the impermissible psy-
chological and physical burdens a state would place upon a woman by prohibiting the option
of abortion).
168. These decisions may also be seen as vindicating a right "to engage in sex without
bearing or begetting a child." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrTIONAL LAW 1423 (2d ed.
1988).
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strictions on this right have been found an unconstitutional burden on
reproductive decision making in the context of fetal research. The pur-
poses for allowing the use of fetal tissue in research and transplantation,
however, are fundamentally different. In the case of fetal research, the
courts have protected access to fetal tissue when such access benefits the
woman's reproductive autonomy by aiding her in future pregnancy deci-
sions or for diagnostic purposes. 169 The rationale for allowing a parent to
designate the recipient of fetal tissue, on the other hand, is to allow the
parent to provide medical assistance to an ailing individual. Recipient
designation of fetal tissue, however, does not inform or otherwise benefit
a woman's future reproductive decisions, unlike access to some types of
fetal research, nor is it a diagnostic tool. 170 Therefore, the informed-deci-
sion rationale that supports the right of access to tissue in the case of fetal
research will not support the right of recipient designation in the instance
of fetal tissue transplants.
Courts have also invalidated fetal experimentation statutes that indi-
rectly burden a woman's choice to have an abortion. 171 Arguably, a pro-
hibition on recipient designation could discourage a woman from
becoming pregnant or, if already pregnant, dissuade her from undergoing
an abortion because she knows she may not specify the recipient of the
fetal tissue. In this respect, the prohibition resembles certain fetal dispo-
sal statutes. Such statutes are unconstitutional when they discourage
abortion by psychologically penalizing a woman for exercising this
right. 172 This proposal is distinguishable in that it merely removes an
incentive to abort rather than imposing a psychological penalty.
Although fetal disposal statutes are distinguishable from restrictions
on recipient designation, the issue remains whether the indirect burden
imposed impermissibly infringes on the exercise of reproductive choice.
An argument in the affirmative assumes that the decision to become
pregnant or to abort is always "essential to exercise of the constitution-
ally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing .... -"73 The
decision to designate a tissue recipient, however, is related, but not essen-
tial, to a childbearing decision. Restrictions on recipient designation in-
169. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
170. The only way recipient designation could influence future childbearing decisions is if
the ability to supply tissue to a specific individual, the parents included, improves that individ-
ual's health and thereby permits that individual to bear or father a child. Nevertheless, be-
cause the primary motive of such designation would be to improve the recipient's general
health, it is tenuous to suggest that the ability to designate a recipient enhances or benefits a
woman's reproductive autonomy.
171. See Margaret S. v. Edwards (Margaret I), 488 F. Supp. 181 (1980).
172. See id. at 221-23. Fetal disposal statutes have been held invalid in some instances
because they exact a penalty upon a woman by indicating to her through procedural means,
such as forcing her to choose between burial or cremation of the fetus, that abortion is
equivalent to murder.
173. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
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terfere primarily with the interest in supplying fetal tissue to an ailing
individual. While this interest is admittedly important, it should not out-
weigh the state's interest in preventing the degradation of the reproduc-
tive process. The interference with reproductive decision-making is
minimal, at best, and as such, does not render a restriction on recipient
designation unconstitutional. 174
In summary, the courts should not recognize recipient designation
as a protected reproductive right because it does not impose, directly or
indirectly, an undue burden on a childbearing decision.
(2) Other Privacy Rights
Decisions recognizing an individual's right to forego life-sustaining
treatment suggest an alternative rationale for protection under the right
to privacy. Several state court opinions have suggested that when "an
individual's health or the integrity of his body is at stake, . . . personal
decisions are the sole prerogative of the person whose body will be af-
fected by that decision."1 75 These decisions are distinguishable on sev-
eral grounds. First, unlike the person who wishes to forego life-
sustaining treatment, the "pregnant woman [is not] isolated in her pri-
vacy." 176 Her decision affects not only her own body but the nascent life
of the fetus as well. In short, to say that a woman has the "sole preroga-
tive" to do with her body as she pleases ignores the balancing of interests
approach embraced in Roe. 177 Second, even if the fetus in utero is not a
separate identity and is only an appendage of the woman, once the abor-
tion procedure has separated the fetus from the woman, it is questionable
whether the detached tissue mass is still the woman's body. 178 Indeed, a
woman's right to donate fetal tissue under the UAGA is conditioned on
her status as parent of the fetus.179 If she is viewed as a parent, then by
implication the statute would seem to view the woman and the fetus as
distinct entities for donation purposes. If the fetus is not a part of the
174. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983) (regula-
tions which have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right may be
permissible).
175. Note, The Sale of Human Organs, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 741, 753; see, eg., Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (right of guardian to termi-
nate treatment including nutrition and hydration); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,
cert. denied sub nom. Gayer v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (right to refuse medical
treatment).
176. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
177. Id at 153-54; see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
178. See generally, Note, Fetal Experimentation: Protocols, Propriety and Parameter,% 11
QUEEN'S L.J. 166, 184-85 (1985) (discussing competing arguments between those that view the
fetus as an appendage or property of the mother and those which view the fetus as a distinct
human life).
179. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACr § 2(b)(3), 8A U.L.A. 34 (West 1983); see supra notes
89-91 and accompanying text.
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woman's body, then property law would only recognize certain quasi-
property interests in the fetus, limited substantially to burial and dona-
tive rights, 180 subject to regulations relating to the health and decency of
the community.
1 8 1
The position that a person, within certain boundaries, should have
complete control over decisions affecting their body and bodily products
is consistent with the dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 18 2 that the right to
privacy means " 'the right to be left alone.' "183 The danger of infringing
on a person's bodily integrity was expressed by Justice Stevens in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists'8 4 in the
context of state control over a woman's abortion decision:
For if federal judges must allow the state to make the abortion deci-
sion, presumably the state is free to decide that a woman may never
abort, may sometimes abort, or, as in the Peoples Republic of China,
must always abort if her family is already too large. In contrast, our
cases represent a consistent view that the individual is primarily re-
sponsible for reproductive decisions, whether the state seeks to pro-
hibit reproduction or require it. 185
What Justice Stevens fears is that a majority of society will impose its
value judgement on the minority.
186
A parallel has been drawn in the context of organ donations. "[O]ur
society refuses to force the donations of organs or tissue from cadavers to
benefit or save the lives of the thousands in need of them." 187 This is
presumably done out of respect for the survivors of the dead as well as
the fact that such compelled donation may have been against the wishes
of the deceased. Following Justice Stevens' reasoning, it is arguable that
if federal judges must allow states to restrict an individual's decision to
donate fetal tissue, as well as prohibit recipient designation, then presum-
ably a state is free to compel fetal tissue donation.
Whether the government can legitimately restrict certain conduct or
activity, however, is a separate question from whether they can compel
that same conduct or activity. The balancing of interests between the
state and the individual differs in each instance and warrants disparate
outcomes. In the case of compelled donations, the state's interest in pro-
180. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PUB. No. OTA-BA-337, 1 NEW DEVELOP-
MENMS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE AND CELLS 72 (1987).
181. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975) aff'd
sub. nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
182. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
183. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1929) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
184. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2188 n.6 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 2187.
187. Nelson & Milken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, Life, Liberty,
and Law in Conflict, 259 J.A.M.A. 1060, 1065 (1988).
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viding organs and tissue, while of vital concern, should not outweigh the
interests of relatives and the wishes of the deceased as to the disposition
of the body. On the other hand, the state has an arguably much stronger
interest in restricting the right to donate fetal tissue to a specific individ-
ual given the dangers of abuse outlined in sections II and III(D).
Preventing the deliberate creation and termination of life is, arguably,
more pressing than a state's interest in procuring cadaver organs.,
Another potential challenge to prohibition of recipient designation
could be brought by potential recipients of fetal tissue who have friends
or relatives willing to donate to them. While a total ban188 on fetal tissue
transplant action might arbitrarily infringe on the rights of potential re-
cipients to receive medical care, the proposal advocated in this Note
avoids this attack because it allows a person access to fetal tissue from an
anonymous source.' 8 9 Undoubtedly, potential transplant recipients have
a stronger interest in fetal tissue than did the researchers in Wynn v.
Scott 90 and Margaret 1' 9 1 Because the recipient's own health is at
stake, use of the tissue produces a more immediate and material benefit
than the academic gains of medical researchers. There is no precedent,
however, which suggests that the recipient's interest in the tissue is
equivalent to a fundamental right to receive tissue from a particular
individual.
188. This would appear to be the situation in states that prohibit any nontherapeutic re-
search on fetuses ex utero. See Baron, supra note 10, at 14-15. The constitutionality of such
statutes depends on a weighing of the individual's right to medical care against the state's
interest in regulating the tissue donation process.
189. Some have questioned whether a parent should even be allowed to anonymously do-
nate fetal tissue. It is argued that once an elective abortion is chosen, a parent forfeits all rights
to consent to use of the fetal tissue. This argument is based on the notion that a parent's
consent for medical procedures involving a fetus requires that the parent be acting in the fetus'
best interest. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 152 (W. Reich ed. 1978). By choosing to have
an abortion, the woman puts herself in a conflict with the best interest of the fetus since she has
chosen its death. Dempsey, supra note 22, at 18.
In this situation, it may be suggested that a third party act as a proxy for the fetus to
determine whether the tissue should be donated. This reasoning does not square with cases
holding that parental rights in a lve aborted fetus cannot be automatically terminated without
due process of law simply because the mother chose an elective abortion for nonhealth-related
reasons. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1986); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d
193, 195 (7th Cir. 1979). This suggests that the choice of elective abortion should not auto-
matically terminate a parent's quasi-property right in a dead fetus. Although quasi-property
rights may not be automatically terminated, they are nonetheless subject to restriction given a
legitimate state interest.
190. 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th
Cir. 1979).
191. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
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D. Substantiality of the State's Interests
Because a prohibition of recipient designation would not unduly
burden the right to privacy, a court would use the rational basis test to
determine the proposal's constitutionality. This test is satisfied when the
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
9 2
States have a legitimate interest in regulating a broad array of social
and health matters. Fetal tissue transplantation falls within this cate-
gory.' 93 In particular, the state has an interest in preventing potential
exploitation and commercialization of women and fetuses through this
procedure. In Margaret I, the court indicated that when a statute is
designed to remove the incentives for researchers to promote abortions or
manipulate timings of abortions for the purpose of supplying fetal tissue
for experimentation, the statute is rationally related to an important state
interest. 194 A prohibition of recipient designation would similarly remove
incentives for pregnancy and abortion for the purpose of supplying fetal
tissue to a specified recipient.
Additionally, the state's interest in the psychological and physical
well being of a woman is protected by the proposal to the extent that it
discourages pregnancy for the sole purpose of supplying tissue. In the
case of intrafamily organ transplants, there is a danger that the donor
will feel pressured to donate fetal tissue. 19 5 Such coercion may preclude
truly voluntary consent. 196 A similar danger exists when a woman can
supply fetal tissue to a relative or friend. Moreover, because fetal tissue
may require less compatibility between the donor and recipient,' 97 a
much larger group of possible recipients could pressure the woman to
donate fetal tissue than in the typical organ transplant situation. Even
when a woman intends to use tissue to benefit herself, thus obviating the
risk of outside coercion, the state still has an interest, albeit weaker, in
protecting against the physical dangers of pregnancy and the abortion
procedure, dangers particularly acute when a woman is already ill. In
the case of a healthy woman who wishes to create tissue for storage,
192. See supra note 26.
193. Cf. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322 (fetal research regulations fall within the category of
social and health matters which states can_ regulate).
194. 794 F.2d 994, 998 n.l1 (5th Cir. 1986).
195. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1983)
(testimony by Dr. Barry Jacobs that guilt may motivate organ donations between family mem-
bers); See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 38, at 1163 (suggesting that potential
organ donors may be subject to great pressure to donate a kidney).
196. See Note, supra note 91, at 1197-98 (the principle that an individual should be al-
lowed to control his own destiny, even to his detriment, should be qualified where free consent
from a live donor is unlikely).
197. See supra, notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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perhaps the strongest interest the state could assert is the prevention of
degradation of the reproductive process.
E. The Proposal is Not "Unnecessarily" Broad
Roe requires that when fundamental rights are infringed, regulations
"must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." 198 The Supreme Court's use of the word "only," however, is de-
ceptive. In defining the permissible bounds of legislation, the Court in
NAACP v. Alabama speaks in terms of regulation that is not "unnecessa-
rily broad" in its scope. 199 Thus, when a particular regulation uninten-
tionally infringes upon fundamental rights, the issue is whether that
regulation might be more narrowly tailored to suit only the state's legiti-
mate interest.
Although a prohibition on recipient designation would not trample
on fundamental rights, the proposal may infringe on the actions of people
not targeted by the regulation. Why, for example, should a pregnant
woman with no prior intention to conceive and abort, and yet is now
pregnant, be prohibited from specifying a recipient of fetal tissue when
she later seeks a legitimate termination of her pregnancy? The proposal,
by not taking into account a person's intentions, would exclude any par-
ent of an electively aborted fetus from being able to designate a recipient,
regardless of the woman's original intentions when she became
pregnant. 20
°
The key is whether the prohibition "unnecessarily" overreaches.
Arguably it does not, given the impracticability of alternative regula-
tions. For instance, to allow "innocent" parents to designate recipients, a
state could require a disinterested medical board to make a determina-
tion of the facts and circumstances surrounding the pregnancy and pro-
posed donation. This board would have to determine whether the
woman intended to become pregnant for the purpose of furnishing tissue
to a specific recipient. Ultimately, however, the board would have no
effective means to arrive at such a determination, since the woman's ac-
count, in many cases, would be the only evidence the board would
have.201 Thus, any truly enforceable regulation in this area cannot turn
on a woman's mental state. Because practical constraints dictate that the
regulation cannot distinguish between different types of elective abortion
donors, the proposal does not unnecessarily infringe on the rights of cer-
198. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
199. 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
200. Similarly, a woman having an abortion for a legitimate health reason would not be
able to donate the tissue either to herself or to anyone else she might designate.
201. Any situation when a woman becomes pregnant and at the same time has a friend or
relative in need will itself suggest that she acted intentionally. Even if the woman has acted
ilnocently, it is difficult to imagine how she could rebut this presumption.
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tain parties. 20 2
Moreover, unlike the statute in Margaret II, 203 the proposal is not
unconstitutionally vague even though it restricts access to fetal tissue
based on the occurrence of an elective abortion. The criminal statute in
Margaret 1I was struck down because a pathologist examining a fetus
would not be able to distinguish spontaneously aborted fetal tissue from
electively aborted fetal tissue.2°4 The current proposal, however, circum-
scribes the powers of parents who will necessarily know whether the fetal
tissue resulted from a spontaneous or elective abortion.
Another scenario in which application of the proposal is arguably
overbroad is when a need for tissue arises after a woman has become
pregnant. For instance, if a woman became pregnant and a relative or
friend was subsequently diagnosed with a disease treatable with fetal tis-
sue, she could demonstrate that she had no ill designs in becoming preg-
nant because she had no anticipated need for fetal tissue when she
originally conceived.
Even in those cases where a woman has not intentionally become
pregnant, however, the state legitimately may retain an interest in remov-
ing incentives to have an abortion. These incentives may arise if a wo-
man feels pressured by an ailing relative into aborting or by a physician
who suggests to the woman that by aborting she may help an anonymous
recipient. Thus, the state's interest in removing incentives to abort out-
weighs an "innocent" donor's interest in recipient designation.
Conclusion
Current fetal tissue regulations do not adequately address the
unique issues presented by fetal tissue transplantation. Fetal tissue trans-
plantation offers promising treatments for a variety of ailments, including
brain disorders, diabetes, and possibly spinal cord injuries. The growing
number of therapeutic applications for fetal tissue, however, will soon
outstrip the current supply. Consequently, because elective abortions
will provide the primary source for the tissue, a woman will have a pow-
erful incentive to conceive and abort to supply another or herself with
tissue. Under most state's versions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
this scenario is permissible since either parent can donate all or part of a
dead fetus to a specific individual.
202. A related argument can be made under the equal protection clause. The regulation
could be attacked as discriminatory in allowing those who have miscarriages to designate a
fetal tissue recipient but prohibiting women who have elective abortions from being able to
specify. This claim should fail insofar as no fundamental right is being impinged. Moreover,
the regulation does not involve any form of invidious discrimination.
203. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
204. Id. at 675-76.
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This Note has proposed that states amend their enactments of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to prohibit parents from designating the
recipient of fetal tissue from an elective abortion. The primary objection
to this proposal will be that it interferes with a woman's constitutionally
protected right to privacy. The Note argues, however, that the right to
privacy as it relates to reproductive autonomy primarily protects deci-
sions of whether or not to bear a child. The ability to designate the recip-
ient of fetal tissue is not essential to the exercise of this right or any other
privacy rights. Furthermore, the proposal is rationally related to a
state's legitimate interest in precluding the exploitation of women and
fetuses, and is, therefore, constitutional.
Admittedly, the proposal will infringe upon the rights of people in
certain borderline cases in which the woman did not intend to conceive
to supply fetal tissue. The most likely situation would occur when the
need for fetal tissue arises after the woman becomes pregnant. Even in
this situation, however, the prohibition of recipient designation removes
a significant incentive to abort because of coercive pressure, thereby serv-
ing a legitimate state interest. Hence, on balance, the benefits gained by
strictly prohibiting recipient designation may outweigh any harm in
those isolated cases in which the regulation arguably overreaches.
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